newcritics

(Cross-posted at The Sawpit.)

I just finished reading the new paperback edition of Ann Finkerbeiner’s 2006 non-fiction book, The Jasons: The Secret History of Science’s Postwar Elite, and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in post-war American history. Finkerbeiner dispels some of the myths surrounding this clandestine organization of brilliant scientists (including many Nobel laureates) who, in addition to their regular teaching and research positions at major universities and think tanks, have worked outside the scrutiny of the open scientific community in order to solve classified problems for the government. More importantly, it asks the tough moral questions surrounding the development and use of nuclear power, and "dual use" technologies. Finkerbeiner’s interviews with current and former Jason members — Freeman Dyson, Sid Drell, Richard Garwin, Charles Townes, Marvin Goldberger — are surprisingly casual, and very candid. All have given a lot of thought to their moral obligations as scientists, academics, citizens, and government advisors. Of course, the members of JASON (as they prefer) are very careful not to divulge any classified information. One Jason scientist insisted on being identified as Dr. X in order to remain anonymous. Apparently, being publicly identified as a Jason can be problematic.

The Arrogance of Physicists had been the book’s working title because, as the author explains, "a physicist can solve any problem in any field by figuring it out from first principles, from the ground up." And this gives the physicist a feeling of superiority to other fields of science, such as biology or chemistry. Apparently, physicists do not see this humorous term as an insult. Among the arrogant physicists of the Manhattan Project who advised Jasons’ first official members were Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, Enrico Fermi, and Robert Oppenheimer — known for his opposition to the hydrogen bomb during the early years of the Cold War, which resulted in his security clearance being revoked. Although they knew Germany’s scientists were also working to build an atomic bomb, they still felt a strong sense of moral responsibility. Many Jasons have dedicated their lives to ensuring that nuclear research is kept in civilian control, and that the international community prevents further proliferation and testing.

One of the main catalysts for the creation of Jason, was the Soviet’s successful 1957 launch of Sputnik and Sputnik II (which carried a dog about the same weight as an atomic warhead). Congress quickly demanded more defense research and better scientific education. Jason grew out of this swell of government funding but it was created by academics as an independent advisory organization in order to be as immune from the pressures of politics as possible. The logic being that only independent outsiders can offer the government unbiased advise based on pure science. Of course, Jason has always been politically savvy, otherwise they could not have survived until today.

In 1972, The Pentagon Papers exposed the Jasons as being involved in defense studies on the Vietnam war. Although Jason recommended that the endless bombing raids into North Vietnam be phased out, and although they concluded that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia would have disastrous consequences, antiwar protesters picketed and threatened those Jasons outed in the documents. To be publicly lambasted as war criminals did not sit well for Jasons and many resigned. The problem for the Jasons harkened back to Oppenheimer’s concern that scientists might get carried away with the “technical sweetness of the project” and ignore the moral consequences.

Scientists must draw a line, however, between what they will or will not work on. Given that Jasons are motivated by patriotism, not just the passion for solving the big problems, they must find a balance between public service, and public responsibility. Of course, it is not surprising that some of the recommendations that Jason has made were ignored by the government: The SST was given the green light by the Nixon administration in direct opposition to a Jason study because the French and British were already building one; SDI was initially kept alive because it was a useful bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviet Union, and SDI is still being funded even though its functionality has yet to be proven.

The Jasons continue to be involved with many of today’s controversial headlines: climate change, surveillance technology, genetics, etc. The fundamental lesson I took from this book is simple: like good intelligence analysis, scientific advice must be independent of politics if we value the truth. Also, it has been demonstrated that following Jason report recommendations can save the taxpayer billions of dollars which otherwise may have been spent on expensive projects doomed to failure. The consequences of ignoring unbiased data in favor of narrow political agendas can be disastrous for our country and the world.